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2023-03-17Default PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to off.Andrew Clayton1-0/+4
This prctl(2) option was enabled in commit 0277d8f1 ("Isolation: Fix the enablement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS.") and this was being set by default. This prctl(2) when enabled renders (amongst other things) the set-UID and set-GID bits on executables ineffective after an execve(2). This causes an issue for applications that want to execute the sendmail(8) binary, this includes the PHP mail() function, which is usually set-GID. After some internal discussion it was decided to disable this option by default. Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/852> Fixes: 0277d8f1 ("Isolation: Fix the enablement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS.") Fixes: e2b53e16 ("Added "rootfs" feature.") Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-03-17Improve an error message regarding Unix domain sockets.Andrew Clayton1-1/+1
When starting unit, if its Unix domain control socket was already active you would get an error message like 2023/03/15 18:07:55 [alert] 53875#8669650 connect(5, unix:/tmp/control.sock) succeed, address already in use which is confusing in a couple of regards, firstly we have the classic success/failure message and secondly 'address already in use' is an actual errno value, EADDRINUSE and we didn't get an error from this connect(2). Re-word this error message for greater clarity. Reported-by: Liam Crilly <liam.crilly@nginx.com> Cc: Liam Crilly <liam.crilly@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-03-17Socket: Remove Unix domain listen sockets upon reconfigure.Andrew Clayton3-3/+87
Currently when using Unix domain sockets for requests, if unit is reconfigured then it will fail if it tries to bind(2) again to a Unix domain socket with something like 2023/02/25 19:15:50 [alert] 35274#35274 bind(\"unix:/tmp/unit.sock\") failed (98: Address already in use) When closing such a socket we really need to unlink(2) it. However that presents a problem in that when running as root, while the main process runs as root and creates the socket, it's the router process, that runs as an unprivileged user, e.g nobody, that closes the socket and would thus remove it, but couldn't due to not having permission, even if the socket is mode 0666, you need write permissions on the containing directory to remove a file. There are several options to solve this, all with varying degrees of complexity and utility. 1) Give the user who the router process runs as write permission to the directory containing the listen sockets. These can then be unlink(2)'d from the router process. Simple and would work, but perhaps not the most elegant. 2) Using capabilities(7). The router process could temporarily attain the CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE capability, unlink(7) the socket, then relinquish the capability until required again. These are Linux specific (other systems may have similar mechanisms which would be extra work to support). There is also a, albeit small, window where the router process is running with elevated privileges. 3) Have the main process do the unlink(2), it is after all the process that created the socket. This is what this commit implements. We create a new port IPC message type of NXT_PORT_MSG_SOCKET_UNLINK, that is used by the router process to notify the main process about a Unix domain socket to unlink(2). Upon doing a reconfigure the router process will call nxt_router_listen_socket_release() which will close the socket, we extend this function in the case of non-abstract Unix domain sockets, so that it will send a message to the main process containing a copy of the nxt_sockaddr_t structure that will contain the filename of the socket. In the main process the handler that we have defined, nxt_main_port_socket_unlink_handler(), for this message type will run and allow us to look for the socket in question in the listen_sockets array and remove it and unlink(2) the socket. This then allows the reconfigure to work if it tries to bind(2) again to a socket that previously existed. Link: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/669> Link: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/pull/735> Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-03-17Remove some dormant code from nxt_process_quit().Andrew Clayton1-21/+0
In nxt_process_quit() there is a loop that iterates over the task->thread->runtime->listen_sockets array and closes the connections. This code has been there from the beginning $ git log --pretty=oneline -S'if (rt->listen_sockets != NULL)' e9e5ddd5a5d9ce99768833137eac2551a710becf Refactor of process management. 6f2c9acd1841ca20a1388b34aef64e9f00459090 Processes refactoring. The cycle has been renamed to the runtime. $ git log --pretty=oneline -S'if (cycle->listen_sockets != NULL) {' 6f2c9acd1841ca20a1388b34aef64e9f00459090 Processes refactoring. The cycle has been renamed to the runtime. 16cbf3c076a0aca6d47adaf3f719493674cf2363 Initial version. but never seems to have been used (AFAICT and certainly not recently, confirmed by code inspection and running pytests with a bunch of language modules enabled and the code in question was never executed) as the listen_sockets array has never been populated... until now. The previous commit now adds Unix domain sockets to this array so that they can be unlink(2)'d upon exit and reconfiguration. This has now caused this dormant code to become active as it now tries to close these sockets (from at least the prototype processes), this array is inherited via fork by other processes. The file descriptor for these sockets is set to -1 when they are put into this array. This then results in close(-1) calls which caused multiple failures in the pytests such as > assert not alerts, 'alert(s)' E AssertionError: alert(s) E assert not ['2023/03/09 23:26:14 [alert] 137673#137673 socket close(-1) failed (9: Bad file descriptor)'] I think the simplest thing is to just remove this code. Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-03-17Socket: Remove Unix domain listen sockets at shutdown.Andrew Clayton2-2/+23
If we don't remove the Unix domain listen socket file then when Unit restarts it get an error like 2023/02/25 23:10:11 [alert] 36388#36388 bind(\"unix:/tmp/unit.sock\") failed (98: Address already in use) This patch makes use of the listen_sockets array, that is already allocated in the main process but never populated, to place the Unix domain listen sockets into. At shutdown we can then loop through this array and unlink(2) any Unix domain sockets found therein. Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/792> Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-03-14Router: More accurately allocate request buffer memory.Andrew Clayton1-2/+2
In nxt_router_prepare_msg() we create a buffer (nxt_unit_request_t *req) that gets sent to an application process that contains details about a client request. This buffer was always a little larger than needed due to allocating space for the remote address _and_ port and the local address _and_ port. We also allocate space for the local port separately. ->{local,remote}->length includes the port number and ':' and also the '[]' for IPv6. E.g [2001:db8::1]:8080 ->{local,remote}->address_length represents the length of the unadorned IP address. E.g 2001:db8::1 Update the buffer size so that we only allocate what is actually needed. Suggested-by: Zhidao HONG <z.hong@f5.com> Cc: Zhidao HONG <z.hong@f5.com> Reviewed-by: Zhidao HONG <z.hong@f5.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-03-14Tests: added Perl test with many responses using streaming body.Andrei Zeliankou2-0/+16
2023-03-10Perl: Fix a crash in the language module.Andrew Clayton1-3/+4
User @bes-internal reported a Perl module crasher on GitHub. This was due to a Perl application sending back two responses, for each response we would call down into XS_NGINX__Unit__Sandbox_cb(), the first time pctx->req would point to a valid nxt_unit_request_info_t, the second time pctx->req would be NULL. Add an invalid responses check which covers this case. Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/841> Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-03-10Router: Fix allocation of request buffer sent to application.Andrew Clayton1-0/+1
This fixes an issue reported by @Peter2121 on GitHub. In nxt_router_prepare_msg() we create a buffer (nxt_unit_request_t *req) that gets sent to an application process that contains details about a client request. The req structure comprises various members with the final member being an array (specified as a flexible array member, with its actual length denoted by the req->fields_count member) of nxt_unit_field_t's. These structures specify the length and offset for the various request headers name/value pairs which are stored after some request metadata that is stored immediately after this array of structs as individual nul terminated strings. After this we have the body content data (if any). So it looks a little like (gdb) x /64bs 0x7f38c976e060 0x7f38c976e060: "\353\346\244\t\006" <-- First nxt_unit_field_t 0x7f38c976e066: "" 0x7f38c976e067: "" 0x7f38c976e068: "T\001" 0x7f38c976e06b: "" 0x7f38c976e06c: "Z\001" 0x7f38c976e06f: "" ... 0x7f38c976e170: "\362#\244\v$" <-- Last nxt_unit_field_t 0x7f38c976e176: "" 0x7f38c976e177: "" 0x7f38c976e178: "\342\002" 0x7f38c976e17b: "" 0x7f38c976e17c: "\352\002" 0x7f38c976e17f: "" 0x7f38c976e180: "POST" <-- Start of request metadata 0x7f38c976e185: "HTTP/1.1" 0x7f38c976e18e: "unix:" 0x7f38c976e194: "unix:/dev/shm/842.sock" 0x7f38c976e1ab: "" 0x7f38c976e1ac: "fedora" 0x7f38c976e1b3: "/842.php" 0x7f38c976e1bc: "HTTP_HOST" <-- Start of header fields 0x7f38c976e1c6: "fedora" 0x7f38c976e1cd: "HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO" 0x7f38c976e1e4: "https" ... 0x7f38c976e45a: "HTTP_COOKIE" 0x7f38c976e466: "PHPSESSID=8apkg25r9s9vju3pi085i21eh4" 0x7f38c976e48b: "public_form=sended" <-- Body content Well that's how things are supposed to look! When using Unix domain sockets what we actually got looked like ... 0x7f6141f3445a: "HTTP_COOKIE" 0x7f6141f34466: "PHPSESSID=uo5b2nu9buijkc89jotbgmd60vpublic_form=sended" Here, the body content (from a POST for example) has been appended straight onto the end of the last header field value. In this case corrupting the PHP session cookie. The body content would still be found by the application as its offset into this buffer is correct. This problem was actually caused by a0327445 ("PHP: allowed to specify URLs without a trailing '/'.") which added an extra item into this request buffer specifying the port number that unit is listening on that handled this request. Unfortunately when I wrote that patch I didn't increase the size of this request buffer to accommodate it. When using normal TCP sockets we actually end up allocating more space than required for this buffer, we track the end of this buffer up to where the body content would go and so we have a few spare bytes between the nul byte of the last field header value and the start of the body content. When using Unix domain sockets, they have no associated port number and thus the port number has a length of 0 bytes, but we still write a '\0' in there using up a byte that we didn't account for, this causes us to loose the nul byte of the last header fields value causing the body data to be appended to the last header field value. The fix is simple, account for the local port length, we also add 1 to it, this covers the nul byte, even if there is no port as with Unix domain sockets. Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/842> Fixes: a0327445 ("PHP: allowed to specify URLs without a trailing '/'.") Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-03-07Tests: _clear_temp_dir() function introduced.Andrei Zeliankou1-26/+31
Also added temporary directory clearing after checking available modules to prevent garbage environment when tests start.
2023-03-07Adding the NGINX Code of Conduct to the repo.Dave McAllister1-0/+74
This adds the NGINX Code of Conduct file to the repo, one of the community guides requested and tracked for community health by the NGINX community and by GitHub insights. [ Re-flowed the commit message - Andrew ] Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-28contrib: fixed njs make rule.Konstantin Pavlov1-1/+1
2023-03-01Merged with the 1.29 branch.Andrei Zeliankou11-14/+67
2023-02-28Unit 1.29.1 release.Andrei Zeliankou1-0/+1
2023-02-28Generated Dockerfiles for Unit 1.29.1.1.29.1Andrei Zeliankou8-8/+8
2023-02-28Added version 1.29.1 CHANGES.Andrei Zeliankou2-2/+23
2023-02-28Changes moved to the correct section.Andrei Zeliankou1-7/+7
2023-02-28Added missing fixes in changes.xml.Andrei Zeliankou1-1/+46
2023-02-28Added missing fixes in changes.xml.Andrei Zeliankou1-0/+39
2023-02-27contrib: updated njs to 0.7.10.Konstantin Pavlov3-3/+3
2023-02-27contrib: updated njs to 0.7.10.Konstantin Pavlov3-3/+3
2023-02-27Tools: improved detection of unitd control socket.Liam Crilly1-5/+5
Now unitc obtains the path to the unitd binary from information contained in the unitd: main process. If unitd was started with an explicit path then that path will be used to obtain the default control socket, instead of using the unitd binary in $PATH.
2023-02-24Set a safer umask(2) when running as a daemon.Andrew Clayton1-3/+3
When running as a daemon. unit currently sets umask(0), i.e no umask. This is resulting in various directories being created with a mode of 0777, e.g rwxrwxrwx this is currently affecting cgroup and rootfs directories, which are being created with a mode of 0777, and when running as a daemon as there is no umask to restrict the permissions. This also affects the language modules (the umask is inherited over fork(2)) whereby unless something explicitly sets a umask, files and directories will be created with full permissions, 0666 (rw-rw-rw-)/ 0777 (rwxrwxrwx) respectively. This could be an unwitting security issue. My original idea was to just remove the umask(0) call and thus inherit the umask from the executing shell/program. However there was some concern about just inheriting whatever umask was in effect. Alex suggested that rather than simply removing the umask(0) call we change it to a value of 022 (which is a common default), which will result in directories and files with permissions at most of 0755 (rwxr-xr-x) & 0644 (rw-r--r--). If applications need some other umask set, they can (as they always have been able to) set their own umask(2). Suggested-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-24Isolation: rootfs: Set the sticky bit on the tmp directory.Andrew Clayton1-1/+1
When using the 'rootfs' isolation option, by default a tmpfs filesystem is mounted on tmp/. Currently this is mounted with a mode of 0777, i.e drwxrwxrwx. 3 root root 60 Feb 22 11:56 tmp however this should really have the sticky bit[0] set (as is per-normal for such directories) to prevent users from having free reign on the files contained within. What we really want is it mounted with a mode of 01777, i.e drwxrwxrwt. 3 root root 60 Feb 22 11:57 tmp [0]: To quote inode(7) "The sticky bit (S_ISVTX) on a directory means that a file in that directory can be renamed or deleted only by the owner of the file, by the owner of the directory, and by a privileged process." Reviewed-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-23Set a safer umask(2) when running as a daemon.Andrew Clayton1-3/+3
When running as a daemon. unit currently sets umask(0), i.e no umask. This is resulting in various directories being created with a mode of 0777, e.g rwxrwxrwx this is currently affecting cgroup and rootfs directories, which are being created with a mode of 0777, and when running as a daemon as there is no umask to restrict the permissions. This also affects the language modules (the umask is inherited over fork(2)) whereby unless something explicitly sets a umask, files and directories will be created with full permissions, 0666 (rw-rw-rw-)/ 0777 (rwxrwxrwx) respectively. This could be an unwitting security issue. My original idea was to just remove the umask(0) call and thus inherit the umask from the executing shell/program. However there was some concern about just inheriting whatever umask was in effect. Alex suggested that rather than simply removing the umask(0) call we change it to a value of 022 (which is a common default), which will result in directories and files with permissions at most of 0755 (rwxr-xr-x) & 0644 (rw-r--r--). If applications need some other umask set, they can (as they always have been able to) set their own umask(2). Suggested-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-22Isolation: rootfs: Set the sticky bit on the tmp directory.Andrew Clayton1-1/+1
When using the 'rootfs' isolation option, by default a tmpfs filesystem is mounted on tmp/. Currently this is mounted with a mode of 0777, i.e drwxrwxrwx. 3 root root 60 Feb 22 11:56 tmp however this should really have the sticky bit[0] set (as is per-normal for such directories) to prevent users from having free reign on the files contained within. What we really want is it mounted with a mode of 01777, i.e drwxrwxrwt. 3 root root 60 Feb 22 11:57 tmp [0]: To quote inode(7) "The sticky bit (S_ISVTX) on a directory means that a file in that directory can be renamed or deleted only by the owner of the file, by the owner of the directory, and by a privileged process." Reviewed-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-21Tests: switched to using f-strings.Andrei Zeliankou74-778/+695
Previously, it was necessary to support older versions of Python for compatibility. F-strings were released in Python 3.6. Python 3.5 was marked as unsupported by the end of 2020, so now it's possible to start using f-strings safely for better readability and performance.
2023-02-21Tests: added Python tests with encoding.Andrei Zeliankou3-0/+98
2023-02-21Tests: added Python tests with encoding.Andrei Zeliankou3-0/+98
2023-02-21Tests: removed list usage as default argument.Andrei Zeliankou1-1/+3
Mutable types as default arguments is bad practice since they are evaluated only once when the function is defined.
2023-02-20Tools: using nicer characters for showing a tree.Alejandro Colomar1-19/+19
Especially in small trees, ASCII characters are confusing. Use nicer UTF-8 characters, which are more readable to the audience of this script. We don't expect the audience of this script to have limited environments where these characters will not be shown, but if that happens, we could improve the script to select the caracters based on the locale. Suggested-by: Liam Crilly <liam@nginx.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
2023-02-17Remove the nxt_getpid() alias.Andrew Clayton2-4/+1
Since the previous commit, nxt_getpid() is only ever aliased to getpid(2). nxt_getpid() was only used once in the code, while there are multiple direct uses of getpid(2) $ grep -r "getpid()" src/ src/nxt_unit.c: nxt_unit_pid = getpid(); src/nxt_process.c: nxt_pid = nxt_getpid(); src/nxt_process.c: nxt_pid = getpid(); src/nxt_lib.c: nxt_pid = getpid(); src/nxt_process.h:#define nxt_getpid() \ src/nxt_process.h:#define nxt_getpid() \ src/nxt_process.h: getpid() Just remove it and convert the _single_ instance of nxt_getpid() to getpid(2). Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-17Isolation: Remove the syscall(SYS_getpid) wrapper.Andrew Clayton1-9/+0
When using SYS_clone we used the getpid kernel system call directly via syscall(SYS_getpid) to avoid issues with cached pids. However since we are now only using fork(2) (+ unshare(2) for namespaces) we no longer need to call the kernel getpid directly as the fork(2) will ensure the cached pid is invalidated. Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-17Isolation: Remove nxt_clone().Andrew Clayton2-17/+0
Since the previous commit, this is no longer used. Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-17Isolation: Switch to fork(2) & unshare(2) on Linux.Andrew Clayton1-9/+247
On GitHub, @razvanphp & @hbernaciak both reported issues running the APCu PHP module under Unit. When using this module they were seeing errors like 'apcu_fetch(): Failed to acquire read lock' However when running APCu under php-fpm, everything was fine. The issue turned out to be due to our use of SYS_clone breaking the pthreads(7) API used by APCu. Even if we had been using glibc's clone(2) wrapper we would still have run into problems due to a known issue there. Essentially the problem is when using clone, glibc doesn't update the TID cache, so the child ends up having the same TID as the parent and that is used in various parts of pthreads(7) such as in the various locking primitives, so when APCu was grabbing a lock it ended up using the TID of the main unit process (rather than that of the php application processes that was grabbing the lock). So due to the above what was happening was when one of the application processes went to grab either a read or write lock, the lock was actually being attributed to the main unit process. If a process had acquired the write lock, then if a process tried to acquire a read or write lock then glibc would return EDEADLK due to detecting a deadlock situation due to thinking the process already held the write lock when in fact it didn't. It seems the right way to do this is via fork(2) and unshare(2). We already use fork(2) on other platforms. This requires a few tricks to keep the essence of the processes the same as before when using clone 1) We use the prctl(2) PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER option (if its available, since Linux 3.4) to make the main unit process inherit prototype processes after a double fork(2), rather than them being reparented to 'init'. This avoids needing to ^C twice to fully exit unit when running in the foreground. It's probably also better if they maintain their parent child relationship where possible. 2) We use a double fork(2) technique on the prototype processes to ensure they themselves end up in a new PID namespace as PID 1 (when CLONE_NEWPID is being used). When using unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), the calling process is _not_ placed in the namespace (as discussed in pid_namespaces(7)). It only sets things up so that subsequent children are placed in a PID namespace. Having the prototype processes as PID 1 in the new PID namespace is probably a good thing and matches the behaviour of clone(2). Also, some isolation tests break if the prototype process is not PID 1. 3) Due to the above double fork(2) the main unit process looses track of the prototype process ID, which it needs to know. To solve this, we employ a simple pipe(2) between the main unit and prototype processes and pass the prototype grandchild PID from the parent of the second fork(2) before exiting. This needs to be done from the parent and not the grandchild, as the grandchild will see itself having a PID of 1 while the main process needs its externally visible PID. Link: <https://www.php.net/manual/en/book.apcu.php> Link: <https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=21793> Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/694> Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-17Enable the PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER prctl(2) option on Linux.Andrew Clayton1-0/+13
This prctl(2) option can be used to set the "child subreaper" attribute of the calling process. This allows a process to take on the role of 'init', which means the process will inherit descendant processes when their immediate parent terminates. This will be used in an upcoming commit that uses a double fork(2) + unshare(2) to create a new PID namespace. The parent from the second fork will terminate leaving the child process to be inherited by 'init'. Aside from it being better to maintain the parent/child relationships between the various unit processes, without setting this you need to ^C twice to fully quit unit when running in the foreground after the double fork. Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-17Isolation: Rename NXT_HAVE_CLONE -> NXT_HAVE_LINUX_NS.Andrew Clayton8-25/+25
Due to the need to replace our use of clone/__NR_clone on Linux with fork(2)/unshare(2) for enabling Linux namespaces(7) to keep the pthreads(7) API working. Let's rename NXT_HAVE_CLONE to NXT_HAVE_LINUX_NS, i.e name it after the feature, not how it's implemented, then in future if we change how we do namespaces again we don't have to rename this. Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-17Isolation: Fix the enablement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS.Andrew Clayton1-1/+1
This prctl(2) option is checked for in auto/isolation, unfortunately due to a typo this feature has never been enabled. In the auto/isolation script the feature name was down as NXT_HAVE_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS0, which means we end up with the following in build/nxt_auto_config.h #ifndef NXT_HAVE_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS0 #define NXT_HAVE_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS0 1 #endif Whereas everywhere else is checking for NXT_HAVE_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS. This also guards the inclusion of sys/prctl.h in src/nxt_process.c which is required by a subsequent commit. Fixes: e2b53e1 ("Added "rootfs" feature.") Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-06Packages: get rid of deprecated configure options.Konstantin Pavlov8-20/+20
2023-01-30NJS: adding the missing vm destruction.Zhidao HONG8-4/+69
This commit fixed the njs memory leak happened in the config validation, updating and http requests.
2023-02-07Python: ASGI: Don't log asyncio.get_running_loop() errors.Andrew Clayton1-2/+5
This adds a check to nxt_python_asgi_get_event_loop() on the event_loop_func name in the case that running that function fails, and if it's get_running_loop() that failed we skip printing an error message as this is an often expected behaviour since the previous commit and we don't want users reporting erroneous bugs. This check will always happen regardless of Python version while it really only applies to Python >= 3.7, there didn't seem much point adding complexity to the code for this case and in what will be an ever diminishing case of people running older Pythons. Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-07Python: ASGI: Switch away from asyncio.get_event_loop().Andrew Clayton1-1/+20
Several users on GitHub reported issues with running Python ASGI apps on Unit with Python 3.11.1 (this would also effect Python 3.10.9) with the following error from Unit 2023/01/15 22:43:22 [alert] 0#77128 [unit] Python failed to call 'asyncio.get_event_loop' TL;DR asyncio.get_event_loop() is currently broken due to the process of deprecating part or all of it. First some history. In Unit we had this commit commit 8dcb0b9987033d0349a6ecf528014a9daa574787 Author: Max Romanov <max.romanov@nginx.com> Date: Thu Nov 5 00:04:59 2020 +0300 Python: request processing in multiple threads. One of things this did was to create a new asyncio event loop in each thread using asyncio.new_event_loop(). It's perhaps worth noting that all these asyncio.* functions are Python functions that we call from the C code in Unit. Then we had this commit commit f27fbd9b4d2bdaddf1e7001d0d0bc5586ba04cd4 Author: Max Romanov <max.romanov@nginx.com> Date: Tue Jul 20 10:37:54 2021 +0300 Python: using default event_loop for main thread for ASGI. This changed things so that Unit calls asyncio.get_event_loop() in the _main_ thread (but still calls asyncio.new_event_loop() in the other threads). asyncio.get_event_loop() up until recently would either return an already running event loop or return a newly created one. This was done for $reasons that the commit message and GitHub issue #560 hint at. But the intimation is that there can already be an event loop running from the application (I assume it's referring to the users application) at this point and if there is we should use it. Now for the Python side of things. On the main branch we had commit 172c0f2752d8708b6dda7b42e6c5a3519420a4e8 Author: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com> Date: Sun Apr 25 13:40:44 2021 +0300 bpo-39529: Deprecate creating new event loop in asyncio.get_event_loop() (GH-23554) This commit began the deprecating of asyncio.get_event_loop(). commit fd38a2f0ec03b4eec5e3cfd41241d198b1ee555a Author: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com> Date: Tue Dec 6 19:42:12 2022 +0200 gh-93453: No longer create an event loop in get_event_loop() (#98440) This turned asyncio.get_event_loop() into a RuntimeError _if_ there isn't a current event loop. commit e5bd5ad70d9e549eeb80aadb4f3ccb0f2f23266d Author: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com> Date: Fri Jan 13 14:40:29 2023 +0200 gh-100160: Restore and deprecate implicit creation of an event loop (GH-100410) This re-creates the event loop if there wasn't one and emits a deprecation warning. After at least the last two commits Unit no longer works with the Python _main_ branch. Meanwhile on the 3.11 branch we had commit 3fae04b10e2655a20a3aadb5e0d63e87206d0c67 Author: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com> Date: Tue Dec 6 17:15:44 2022 +0200 [3.11] gh-93453: Only emit deprecation warning in asyncio.get_event_loop when a new event loop is created (#99949) which is what caused our breakage, though perhaps unintentionally as we get the following traceback Traceback (most recent call last): File "/usr/lib64/python3.11/asyncio/events.py", line 676, in get_event_loop f = sys._getframe(1) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ValueError: call stack is not deep enough 2023/01/18 02:46:10 [alert] 0#180279 [unit] Python failed to call 'asyncio.get_event_loop' However, regardless, it is clear we need to stop using asyncio.get_event_loop(). One option is to switch to the higher level asyncio.run() API, however that is a rather large change. This commit takes the simpler approach of using asyncio.get_running_loop() (which it seems get_event_loop() will eventually be an alias of) in the _main_ thread to return the currently running event loop, or if there is no current event loop, it will call asyncio.new_event_loop() to return a newly created event loop. I believe this mimics the current behaviour. In my testing get_event_loop() seemed to always return a newly created loop, as when just calling get_running_loop() it would return NULL and we would fail out. When running two processes each with 2 threads we would get the following loops with Python 3.11.0 and unpatched Unit <_UnixSelectorEventLoop running=False closed=False debug=False> <_UnixSelectorEventLoop running=False closed=False debug=False> <_UnixSelectorEventLoop running=False closed=False debug=False> <_UnixSelectorEventLoop running=False closed=False debug=False> and with Python 3.11.1 and a patched Unit we would get <_UnixSelectorEventLoop running=False closed=False debug=False> <_UnixSelectorEventLoop running=False closed=False debug=False> <_UnixSelectorEventLoop running=False closed=False debug=False> <_UnixSelectorEventLoop running=False closed=False debug=False> Tested-by: RafaƂ Safin <rafal.safin12@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-02-07Python: ASGI: Factor out event loop creation to its own function.Andrew Clayton1-21/+35
This is a preparatory patch that factors out the asyncio event loop creation code from nxt_python_asgi_ctx_data_alloc() into its own function, to facilitate being called multiple times. This a part of the work to move away from using the asyncio.get_event_loop() function due to it no longer creating event loops if there wasn't one running. See the following commit for the gory details. Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-01-31Added default values for pathnames.Alejandro Colomar15-159/+152
This allows one to simply run `./configure` and expect it to produce sane defaults for an install. Previously, without specifying `--prefix=...`, `make install` would simply fail, recommending to set `--prefix` or `DESTDIR`, but that recommendation was incomplete at best, since it didn't set many of the subdirs needed for a good organization. Setting `DESTDIR` was even worse, since that shouldn't even affect an installation (it is required to be transparent to the installation). /usr/local is the historic Unix standard path to use for installations from source made manually by the admin of the system. Some package managers (Homebrew, I'm looking specifically at you) have abused that path to install their things, but 1) it's not our fault that someone else incorrectly abuses that path (and they seem to be fixing it for newer archs; e.g., they started using /opt/homebrew for Apple Silicon), 2) there's no better path than /usr/local, 3) we still allow changing it for systems where this might not be the desired path (MacOS Intel with hombrew), and 4) it's _the standard_. See a related conversation with Ingo (OpenBSD maintainer): On 7/27/22 16:16, Ingo Schwarze wrote: > Hi Alejandro, [...] > > Alejandro Colomar wrote on Sun, Jul 24, 2022 at 07:07:18PM +0200: >> On 7/24/22 16:57, Ingo Schwarze wrote: >>> Alejandro Colomar wrote on Sun, Jul 24, 2022 at 01:20:46PM +0200: > >>>> /usr/local is for sysadmins to build from source; > >>> Doing that is *very* strongly discouraged on OpenBSD. > >> I guess that's why the directory was reused in the BSDs to install ports >> (probably ports were installed by the sysadmin there, and by extension, >> ports are now always installed there, but that's just a guess). > > Maybe. In any case, the practice of using /usr/local for packages > created from ports is significantly older than the recommendation > to refrain from using upstream "make install" outside the ports > framework. > > * The FreeBSD ports framework was started by Jordan Hubbard in 1993. > * The ports framework was ported from FreeBSD to OpenBSD > by Niklas Hallqvist in 1996. > * NetBSD pkgsrc was forked from FreeBSD ports by Alistair G. Crooks > and Hubert Feyrer in 1997. > > I failed to quickly find Jordan's original version, but rev. 1.1 > of /usr/ports/infrastructure/mk/bsd.port.mk in OpenBSD (dated Jun 3 > 22:47:10 1996 UTC) already said > > LOCALBASE ?= /usr/local > PREFIX ?= ${LOCALBASE} > [...] >> I had a discussion in NGINX Unit about it, and >> the decission for now has been: "support prefix=/usr/local for default >> manual installation through the Makefile, and let BSD users adjust to >> their preferred path". > > That's an *excellent* solution for the task, thanks for doing it > the right way. By setting PREFIX=/usr/local by default in the > upstream Makefile, you are minimizing the work for *BSD porters. > > The BSD ports frameworks will typically run the upstreak "make install" > with the variable DESTDIR set to a custom value, for example > > DESTDIR=/usr/ports/pobj/groff-1.23.0/fake-amd64 > > so if the upstream Makefile sets PREFIX=/usr/local , > that's perfect, everything gets installed to the right place > without an intervention by the person doing the porting. > > Of course, if the upstream Makefile would use some other PREFIX, > that would not be a huge obstacle. All we have to do in that case > is pass the option --prefix=/usr/local to the ./configure script, > or something equivalent if the software isn't using GNU configure. > >> We were concerned that we might get collisions >> with the BSD port also installing in /usr/local, but that's the least >> evil (and considering BSD users don't typically run `make install`, it's >> not so bad). > > It's not bad at all. It's perfect. > > Of course, if a user wants to install *without* the ports framework, > they have to provide their own --prefix. But that's not an issue > because it is easy to do, and installing without a port is discouraged > anyway. === Directory variables should never contain a trailing slash (I've learned that the hard way, where some things would break unexpectedly). Especially, make(1) is likely to have problems when things have double slashes or a trailing slash, since it treats filenames as text strings. I've removed the trailing slash from the prefix, and added it to the derivate variables just after the prefix. pkg-config(1) also expects directory variables to have no trailing slash. === I also removed the code that would set variables as depending on the prefix if they didn't start with a slash, because that is a rather non-obvious behavior, and things should not always depend on prefix, but other dirs such as $(runstatedir), so if we keep a similar behavior it would be very unreliable. Better keep variables intact if set, or use the default if unset. === Print the real defaults for ./configure --help, rather than the actual values. === I used a subdirectory under the standard /var/lib for NXT_STATE, instead of a homemade "state" dir that does the same thing. === Modified the Makefile to create some dirs that weren't being created, and also remove those that weren't being removed in uninstall, probably because someone forgot to add them. === Add new options for setting the new variables, and rename some to be consistent with the standard names. Keep the old ones at configuration time for compatibility, but mark them as deprecated. Don't keep the old ones at exec time. === A summary of the default config is: Unit configuration summary: bin directory: ............. "/usr/local/bin" sbin directory: ............ "/usr/local/sbin" lib directory: ............. "/usr/local/lib" include directory: ......... "/usr/local/include" man pages directory: ....... "/usr/local/share/man" modules directory: ......... "/usr/local/lib/unit/modules" state directory: ........... "/usr/local/var/lib/unit" tmp directory: ............. "/tmp" pid file: .................. "/usr/local/var/run/unit/unit.pid" log file: .................. "/usr/local/var/log/unit/unit.log" control API socket: ........ "unix:/usr/local/var/run/unit/control.unit.sock" Link: <https://www.gnu.org/prep/standards/html_node/Directory-Variables.html> Link: <https://refspecs.linuxfoundation.org/FHS_3.0/fhs/index.html> Reviewed-by: Artem Konev <a.konev@f5.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com> Tested-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Pavlov <thresh@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com>
2023-01-30Tests: Add some PHP tests for 403 and 404 error handling.Andrew Clayton2-1/+21
Since the previous commit, we now properly handle 403 Forbidden & 404 Not Found errors in the PHP language module. This adds a test for 403 Forbidden to test/test_php_application.py, but also fixes a test in test/test_php_targets.py where we were checking for 503 but should have been a 404, which we now do. Acked-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Cc: Andrei Zeliankou <zelenkov@nginx.com> [ Incorporates a couple of small test cleanups from Andrei ] Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-01-27PHP: Implement better error handling.Andrew Clayton1-5/+40
Previously the PHP module would produce one of four status codes 200 OK 301 Moved Permanently 500 Internal Server Error 503 Service Unavailable 200 for successful requests, 301 for cases where the url was a directory without a trailing '/', 500 for bad PHP or non-existing PHP file and 503 for all other errors. With this commit we now handle missing files and directories, returning 404 Not Found and files and directories that don't allow access, returning 403 Forbidden. We do these checks in two places, when we check if we should do a directory redirect (bar -> bar/) and in the nxt_php_execute() function. One snag with the latter is that the php_execute_script() function only returns success/failure (no reason). However while it took a zend_file_handle structure with the filename of the script to run, we can instead pass through an already opened file-pointer (FILE *) via that structure. So we can try opening the script ourselves and do the required checks before calling php_execute_script(). We also make use of the zend_stream_init_fp() function that initialises the zend_file_handle structure if it's available otherwise we use our own version. This is good because the zend_file_handle structure has changed over time and the zend_stream_init_fp() function should change with it. Closes: <https://github.com/nginx/unit/issues/767> Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Cc: Andrei Zeliankou <zelenkov@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-01-27PHP: Simplify ctx->script_filename.start in nxt_php_execute().Andrew Clayton1-4/+5
Create a const char *filename variable to hold ctx->script_filename.start, which is a much more manageable name and will negate the need for any more casting in the following commit when we switch to using a FILE * instead of a filename in php_execute_script(). Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Cc: Andrei Zeliankou <zelenkov@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-01-27PHP: Make use of zend_stream_init_filename().Andrew Clayton1-6/+6
Where possible make use of the zend_stream_init_filename() function introduced in PHP 7.4. This is essentially a preparatory patch for switching to using an already opened file-pointer in nxt_php_execute(). While wrapping this new code in a PHP version check with a fallback to our own function is perhaps slightly overkill, it does reduce the diff of the commit that switches to a FILE *. Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Cc: Andrei Zeliankou <zelenkov@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-01-27PHP: Factored out code into a helper function.Alejandro Colomar1-10/+19
We're going to use zend_stream_init_filename in a following commit. To reduce the diff of that change, move the current code that will be replaced, to a function that has the same interface. We use strlen(3) here to be able to use an interface without passing the length, but we will remove that call in a following code, so it has no performance issues. Co-developed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@nginx.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com> Cc: Andrei Zeliankou <zelenkov@nginx.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Clayton <a.clayton@nginx.com>
2023-01-24Tests: added NJS iteration tests.Andrei Zeliankou1-0/+6